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Reducing the impact of the next 
influenza pandemic using household-
based public health interventions
Key Message
Household-based public health 
interventions can effectively 
mitigate the impact of influenza 
pandemic, and the resources 
and compliance requirement are 
realistic and feasible.
Hong Kong Med J 2009;15(Suppl 9):S38-41
Introduction 
Wherever a pandemic influenza strain evolves, there is a period of time during 
which the disease has not yet reached some populations. This allows these 
populations to implement interventions to reduce local transmissibility (measured 
by the basic reproductive number R0) prior to the introduction of the strain. 
This may reduce the infection attack rate (IAR) once the pandemic arrives. We 
estimated the reduction in IAR after different household-based interventions using 
a mathematical model of influenza transmission within and between households. 
Household-based interventions, such as voluntary quarantine and antiviral 
prophylaxis, may reduce the IAR substantially, without consuming resources 
at the same rate as non-targeted population-level interventions. To estimate the 
impact of household-based interventions on IAR, we used an individual-based 
stochastic model of influenza transmission with explicit household, peer-group, 
and community settings.
Aims and objectives
To estimate the effectiveness of preventive measures that communities might 
implement to reduce the impact of pandemic influenza.
Methods 
In this simulation, the distribution of household sizes and the average numbers of 
children in households of different sizes were made to be consistent with Hong 
Kong.2 All interventions were active prior to the arrival of the infected individuals, 
and the population had a constant introduction of 1.5 infected individuals per 
day per 100 000 inhabitants for 365 days. Susceptible individuals reported with 
influenza-like-illness, caused by something other than the pandemic influenza 
strain, at a constant rate of 74 per day per 100 000 inhabitants (according to 
Hong Kong Centre for Health Protection, www.chp.gov.hk, Data and Statistics, 
Sentinel Surveillance).
 Household-based interventions were simulated as an integrated process of 
voluntary household quarantine, voluntary individual isolation, and contact 
tracing. Quarantine referred to segregation of household contacts of a suspected 
patient from other members of the community within their own homes. Isolation 
referred to relocation of symptomatic individuals from their household to a separate 
facility. If an individual complied with household quarantine, his infectivity to 
other household members increased by a factor of ε0 (ε0=2 at baseline). Also, 
the level of transmission in isolation may be higher than elsewhere. The degree 
of transmission in isolation was assumed to be a factor of ε1 greater (ε1=1 at 
baseline). Individuals with symptoms severe enough to warrant hospitalisation 
were assumed to be isolated and to receive antiviral therapy. Compliance 
was modelled at the individual level (ie each member of the household made 
independent decision). We defined pc to be the probability of compliance. These 
interventions were implemented using the following algorithm:
(1) An individual from households not in voluntary quarantine had the opportunity 
to enter the programme via one of the following three routes: developing 
symptoms, being contacted through contact tracing, being hospitalised. 
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We assumed that the subject actually reported with a 
probability pc for symptoms and contact tracing, and 
with probability 1 for hospitalisation, and complied with 
the programme until released. After release, the subject 
was not bound by previous decisions to join or not join, 
ie being able to choose once again. 
(2) Each of the other members of the household complied 
with intervention instructions with a probability pc.
(3) After a delay of 1 day, all compliant non-symptomatic 
household members took one dose of prophylactic 
antivirals per day, when antiviral policies were in effect. 
Symptomatic household members took two doses of 
anitvirals per day.
(4) If contact tracing was in effect, each compliant adult 
member of the household would name, on average, five 
subjects (in their peer-group). 
(5) If isolation was in effect, new symptomatic individuals 
who were compliant would enter voluntary isolation 
with a probability pc after a delay of 1 day. If the isolated 
individuals no longer showed symptoms after 3 days, 
they would be released from isolation and rejoin their 
household, which might be quarantined. Otherwise, 
they would be isolated for a further 3 days. This cycle 
would be repeated until the subjects no longer showed 
symptoms or died.
(6) Isolated individuals were given two doses of antivirals 
per day, without a delay, in all simulations, regardless of 
the policy for the use of antivirals in households. 
(7) If contact tracing was in effect, contacts (whether 
known or not already in the programme) of all new 
symptomatic or hospitalised household members would 
be traced with a mean delay of 1 day. 
(8) In the absence of new symptoms in compliant or 
hospitalised household members for 7 days, the 
quarantined household would be released from the 
programme at that point. Otherwise, they would return 
to step 5.
Results
With compliance rates of 50%, all intervention policies 
substantially reduced IAR. The baseline IAR of 74% was 
reduced to 49% when voluntary household quarantine was 
in effect. However, the peak proportion of households that 
were quarantined, even with compliance rates of only 50%, 
was 9.6%. The addition of voluntary individual isolation 
further reduced the IAR to 43% and the peak proportion 
of households that were quarantined decreased to 7.1%. 
Voluntary individual isolation provided an incentive for 
households to participate: presumed infectious individuals 
may have been prioritised for health care services and 
would have protected household members. However, this 
approach required isolation facilities for up to 0.9% of the 
population at the peak of the epidemic.
 We also considered the use of antivirals with voluntary 
household quarantine. This policy had a similar efficacy to 
voluntary individual isolation (IAR, 44%) at a cost of 3.9 
doses of antiviral per member but with a much smaller peak 
level of isolation of 0.5%. The use of antivirals in addition 
to quarantine and isolation further reduced the IAR to 40% 
and the peak proportion of households that were quarantined 
reduced to 6.2%. The addition of contact tracing reduced the 
IAR to 34% but increased the proportion of the population 
in quarantine considerably. The additional requirements 
of contact tracing are unlikely to be justified unless the 
reproductive number is reduced to near one by other 
interventions. The prevalence of quarantine and isolation 
specifies the resources required by these programmes over 
time, eg the total prevalence of quarantine and isolation on a 
given day indicates the number of antiviral doses that needs 
to be distributed, when the use of antivirals in addition to 
quarantine and isolation is in effect. 
 As the influenza strain that may cause the next pandemic 
has not yet been observed, it is not possible to estimate its 
level of transmissibility (other than by using historical data 
from other strains) or the balance of transmission in different 
settings.1 We used extensive Latin hypercube sampling to 
conduct sensitivity analyses. This suggests that variations 
in the efficacy of policies in reducing the IAR is dominated 
by the basic reproductive number R0.3 All interventions are 
considerably more cost-effective for lower values of R0. 
 The efficacy of quarantine plus antivirals was not 
substantially less than that of quarantine, isolation plus 
antivirals for most parameter combinations. The potential 
for increased transmission in isolation did not seem 
to substantially decrease the efficacy of the voluntary 
individual isolation. Even with isolation transmissibility 
levels 10 times greater than those outside isolation, the 
voluntary individual isolation was still effective (IAR, 
45%), compared to voluntary household quarantine alone 
(IAR, 49%), because the overall proportion of susceptible 
individuals entering isolation was low. Although this 
proportion may have been high during the initial stages, it 
would likely be small when averaged over the entire course 
of the epidemic. 
 All estimated reductions in IAR were sensitive to the 
population compliance rate, pc and to the proportion of 
transmission, θ, which was either asymptomatic or pre-
symptomatic. Values of pc=50% and θ=30% were assumed 
for baseline intervention scenarios. Our estimated changes 
in IAR were also sensitive to the average delay in the 
provision of antivirals and in voluntary isolation, although 
less so than to pc and θ. In deciding whether to implement any 
or all of the policies described, local public health officials 
may wish to consider available epidemiological data (to 
assess R0 and θ) and also estimate the levels of compliance 
that could be achieved for the different options in their 
populations. As compliance may be higher for policies that 
provide immediate benefits to the individual, compliance 
will be low for voluntary household quarantine alone, higher 
for voluntary individual isolation alone, and the use of 
antivirals with voluntary household quarantine, and highest 
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for the use of antivirals with voluntary household quarantine 
and individual isolation. It is likely that the provision of 
antiviral prophylaxis and treatment increases compliance 
substantially. Our baseline assumption of 50% is intended to 
be conservative. It seems that household-based interventions 
work when levels of compliance are high. Even moderate 
levels of compliance render household-based public health 
interventions effective. Also, the marginal benefits from the 
use of antivirals and isolation may not be justified if the 
average times for provision of these services exceed 3 to 4 
days, given that the quarantine period is set at 7 days. 
 Levels of compliance with quarantine and isolation 
would likely improve in the early and late stages of the 
epidemic, when a viable diagnostic method is available. We 
considered the impact of virological testing as a diagnostic 
support for these policies. However, current low throughput 
(limited by both laboratory infrastructure and supplies of 
reagents) and low test sensitivity (due to difficulties in 
obtaining adequate specimens outside of specialised care 
settings) meant that it was not a worthwhile addition. If an 
inexpensive, easy-to-perform, rapid and accurate test was 
available, it would have a significant impact on transmission 
and on peak levels of quarantine, when used as part of a 
wider household-based programme.
Discussion 
For lower transmissibility strains of pandemic influenza, the 
combination of voluntary household quarantine, individual 
isolation, and the prophylactic use of antivirals was highly 
effective and feasible across a range of transmission 
scenarios, even with only moderate levels of compliance. We 
have quantified the resources consumed by this and similar 
policies in terms of numbers of people quarantined, numbers 
of people isolated, and doses of antivirals required. 
 We assume that the natural history of the next pandemic 
strain will be similar to that of the 1918 strain, a reduction 
in IAR from 74% to 40% would avert 16 000 deaths during 
the period of the initial pandemic wave in a city about the 
size of Hong Kong (6.8 million people). Our results suggest 
that such a reduction can be achieved using the combination 
of voluntary quarantine, individual isolation, and antiviral 
therapy. Isolation on such a large scale may be somewhat 
controversial, given the infrastructure requirements of such 
a policy. Therefore, when large stockpiles of antivirals 
are available, the marginal benefit of the additional use of 
isolation may not be justified. However, when stockpiling 
of antivirals is not feasible, individual isolation is the best 
possible addition to household quarantine.
 Our results build on previous modelling studies of 
pandemic influenza which focus on the possibility of 
containment using geographically targeted antiviral 
therapy.1,4 Effective strategies have been identified for 
mitigation rather than containment.5,6 The key outcome of 
mitigation is the reduction in IAR, rather than the likelihood 
of complete control. Given that many epidemiological 
parameters associated with the next influenza pandemic are 
unknown, comparison of results from different modelling 
studies is not straightforward. Our results are consistent 
with the reduction in IAR from 34% to 20%.5 However, 
they are not consistent with other studies, in which a 10 
fold reduction in the numbers of ill people is reported 
for the use of targeted anti-viral prophylaxis.6 This large 
discrepancy is likely due to the optimistic nature of their 
policy: they assume that households, household clusters, 
schools and workplaces can be targeted very efficiently 
for prophylactic antiviral therapy. We suggest that a highly 
efficient contact tracing process be required to achieve high 
levels of coverage between socially connected households, 
which is particularly true in modern urban populations. 
Such a process requires large numbers of households to 
be recruited during short periods of time, which is not 
feasible.
 Reducing the first-wave IAR should be the primary 
goal of influenza preparedness planning. When complete 
transmission control is not achieved, this necessarily 
implies a longer epidemic. If the mortality rate of the 
pandemic strain is considered to be low, it is likely that 
some governments will place priority on reducing the 
duration of the outbreak than on reducing the number of 
infections. For a longer period of societal disruption, policy 
should be designed to reduce mortality and peak stresses 
on the society as a whole. For example, for the baseline 
case, a combination of voluntary household quarantine, 
individual isolation, and use of antivirals could reduce the 
peak incidence of infection from 3.7 to 0.8%. Although such 
analyses are beyond the scope of this work, the likelihood 
of maintaining uninterrupted key societal services (such as 
law enforcement, food distribution and utility provision) 
may improve substantially across this range. Therefore, 
the potential massive adverse economic implications of a 
temporary breakdown may justify extending the expected 
period of disruption.
Conclusions
Household quarantine was not successfully implemented 
on any significant scale during the 1918 city-level 
epidemics upon which estimates of transmissibility are 
based.1,7 Therefore, the likely impact of the interventions 
we described is real and not already incorporated into 
estimates of transmissibility. Modern transport and 
communication infrastructures are much more advanced 
than those available in 1918, so it is reasonable to expect 
that such interventions can now succeed. Many countries 
have put in place formal pandemic preparedness plans 
following a World Health Organization framework. These 
national plans mention the interventions included here, 
but they do not specify the implementation of intervention 
processes in even the broadest terms, nor do they attempt 
to predict the levels of resources required. Our findings 
and future studies, which match detailed descriptions of 
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interventions with realistic transmission models, can help 
to inform pandemic preparedness plans by quantifying both 
the benefits of, and resources required by, household-based 
interventions against pandemic influenza.
 Our measures to increase social distance consume 
substantial resources and therefore detailed planning is 
required. To allow quarantined individuals to remain at 
home, provision of food, water and medicines must be 
made for. This may be achieved through a central system or 
a neighbourhood assistance scheme. For isolation, careful 
planning and investment is required so that large facilities 
can be made operational in time to reduce transmission 
in the early stages of the epidemic. For antivirals to be 
provided efficiently, a dedicated distribution system is 
required.
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